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Terrorism and Africa
On the Danger of Further Attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa
Stefan Mair
The attacks in Mombasa of November 2002 have drawn attention to a region of the
world that had been considered a minor stage in the fight against terrorism following
September 11, namely sub-Saharan Africa.  The alliance against terrorism previously
limited its efforts in this area to preventing al-Qaida fighters from finding refuge in the
Horn of Africa.  What seemed to have been forgotten was that the first monstrous
attacks by al-Qaida took place in East Africa.  In 1998, the US embassies in Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam were bombed, killing 291 and 10 people respectively.  The recent actions
of al-Qaida in the region raise two questions:  Does Africa threaten to become a hotspot
of international terrorism?  And, how can terrorist attacks in Africa be prevented in
the future?
According to the rash conclusion of some
development specialists poverty is the main
cause of terrorism.  If this were in fact the
case, sub-Saharan Africa would provide
ample fertile soil for terrorist cells to take
root and spread.  That both processes are
thus far not discernable adds credence to
the thesis that the causes of terrorism are
complex.  Terrorism is founded on the
interaction of a lack of economic perspec-
tives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural
identity, political repression and a dys-
functional state.  But these factors alone do
not lead inevitably to terrorism.  If they
were, Africa would qualify as the hotspot of
international terrorism.  Instead, rather
than being directed outwards, it appears
that the potential for violence arising from
the interplay of these factors in sub-
Saharan Africa is, for the most part,
directed inwards against ones own society
in the form of increasing violent crime,
civil war and plundering warlords.
Clearly international terrorism requires
two additional factors:  a mobilizing,
unifying idea, such as that offered by
Islamic fundamentalism, and appropriate
agitators, who abuse this idea in order to
organize a powerful terrorist force against a
common external enemy.
Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa
That raises the question of the spread and
strength of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa.
Experts on Islam differentiate between a
number of centers of Islam in the region
including the West African Sahel zone, the
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tropical zone along the Gulf of Guinea, the
Sudanese Nile region, Ethiopia, the East
African coastal strip, the area inhabited by
the Somaal and the Cape region.  In all of
these regions, the spread of Islam took a
different path in which the relative
importance of specific elements of the
religion depended on the historical and
social context.
Nevertheless, the majority of these areas
appear to share two common features.
Islam did not develop into an exclusive
state religion and the interpretation of the
Islamic legal code appears to have been
moderate across the board.  That does not
mean that Islam is not a political force in
these regions.  On the contrary.  In West
Africa, for example, spiritual leaders and
traditional Islamic leaders have played and
continue to play a central role in exercising
political power and maintaining clientele
systems.  Even the long-standing practice of
a moderate interpretation of Islam is
subject to change.  A radicalization has
taken place with the introduction of
shariah in several Nigerian states, rigid
adherence to shariah in Somalia and
extremist tendencies among Muslims in
South Africa.  The reasons for this are in
part rather varied.  In the case of Nigeria, it
appears that aggressive missionary work in
the North by Saudi Wahabis has played a
decisive role in escalating the conflict
between Christians and Muslims, a conflict
that flared up again during the Miss World
competition last year.
Still, despite all the differences, these
processes of radicalization have one thing
in common.  Where Muslims are in the
minority, they generally belong to the
losers of the social and political change
that Africa has gone through over the past
ten years.  That is especially the case in the
coastal states of West and East Africa.  In
West Africa, democratization has removed
Muslim leaders and their followers from
the levers of power; in East Africa the social
advancement of the Muslim minority has
trailed that of the regions already low
average.  The partial loss of power for
Muslims in West Africa stands in funda-
mental conflict with claims to power based
on tradition.  The social conflicts in the
coastal states of West Africa are increas-
ingly developing along a north/south divide
that is largely congruent with the geo-
graphic division between Christians and
Muslims.  This is particularly noticeable in
Nigeria, Ghana and the Ivory Coast.
African Terrorism?
Nevertheless, in the short term it is unlikely
that extremist Muslims in sub-Saharan
Africa will become an important and
integral part of al-Qaidas terrorist network.
In contrast to North Africa, membership is
likely to be limited to a few individuals.  Al-
Qaidas call after the attacks from Mombasa
on African Muslims to join their cause was
met with decidedly more indignation than
approval, with two important exceptions.
First, the Somalian group al-Ittihad al-
Islamya is considered a part of al-Qaida.
They are suspected of carrying out the
attacks in Mombasa  even if some
observers doubt that this group is still
operational.  Second, there are extremist
elements in South Africa that could develop
into terrorist cells.
The possibility, however, of the devel-
opment of a genuine African variant of
terrorism cannot be ruled out entirely.  The
necessary ingredients  a lack of economic
perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of
cultural identity, political repression, and
dysfunctional states  are virtually omni-
present in sub-Saharan Africa.  All that is
needed is a mobilizing idea and agitators in
order to direct the violence bred by these
factors externally.  Indications of this sort
of process already exist.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo it
has become conventional wisdom to
interpret the countrys miseries as the
result of policies of the industrialized
countries.  They are charged with prevent-
ing the development of the country in
order to keep the price of raw materials
down and using states such as Uganda and
SWP Comments 1
February 2003
3
Rwanda in order to ensure access to these
resources by force.  With the attacks in
Kenya and Tanzania, the perception that
Africa has once again, following the end of
the Cold War, become a victim and the
theater of a conflict between external
parties, namely the terrorist network of al
Qaida and the alliance against terrorism, is
likely to strengthen the already widespread
tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.
Africans are increasingly going to wonder if
the war on terrorism is «their» war.
In the next couple of years, the impor-
tance of Africa in terms of international
terrorism will focus on two factors.  First,
the weak and desolate states of Africa
provide an excellent space to draw back to
and their informal economies offer superb
conditions for money laundering and
parking capital.  Second, ineffective state
security apparatuses create a convenient
environment for carrying out attacks.
State Disintegration and Terrorism
Sub-Saharan Africa is home to more failing
states than any other region.  Somalia,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DR Congo are
in the final throes of a process of state
disintegration.  Guinea, Chad, the Central
African Republic, the Republic of Congo,
Sudan and Angola are also in the advance
stages of this process.  But even in more or
less functioning states such as Kenya,
Tanzania, Mali, Zambia, Cameroon, Malawi
and, until recently, the Ivory Coast the state
is hardly capable of effectively maintaining
a monopoly on violence and controlling the
entire territory of the state.  Border areas
and the slums of the big cities are already
de facto zones outside the states control.
The security forces training and equipment
are entirely insufficient and corruption
and criminalization of the police is far
advanced.  The shadow economy of these
crumbling states makes capital transactions
and trafficking in weapons, raw materials,
and consumer goods possible, without
which terrorist networks would be unable
to function.  Although rumors that al-Qaida
is profiting from the diamond trade in
Sierra Leone and precious gems trafficking
in Tanzania have yet to be proven, they are
entirely plausible.
Kenya is an excellent example of the
consequences of eroding state power.  For
years the northeast of the country, which
borders Somalia, has been essentially cut
off from the rest of the state.  Safe travel in
this part of the country is only possible in
militarily protected convoys.  The security
forces have withdrawn to isolated forts,
leaving control of the area to gangs and
Somali warlords.  In the poverty stricken
areas of Nairobi, power basically rests in
the hands of militias run by religious sects
and ethnic leaders.  Well supplied with
weapons from Somalia, they carry out gang
robberies.  Police officers rent weapons and
vehicles to criminal groups and occasion-
ally participate in robberies.  Income from
criminal activities ensure their physical
survival and provide them with the hope of
social advancement.  Under these condi-
tions, the Kenyan security forces would not
have been able to prevent the attacks in
Mombasa even if the government had been
sufficiently informed of the danger and had
taken the situation seriously.  The govern-
ment is currently incapable of controlling
the trading of goods and the movement of
people across the Somali-Kenyan border
even if it were determined to do so.
The incapacity of the majority of African
security forces to protect targets threatened
by terrorism is in stark contrast with the
great variety of such potential targets
including embassies, the numerous
agencies and projects of international
development organizations, subsidiaries
of American and European companies
and international tourist hotels.  The US
embassies and offices of the development
organization USAID already resemble Wild
West forts of the 19th century.  Oil and
mining companies have resorted to
protecting their property with private,
paramilitary security services.  Americans,
Europeans and Africans who can afford to
are increasingly withdrawing to heavily
guarded and elaborately protected gated
communities.  Still, barriers cannot be
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efficiently erected around all threatened
establishments.  This is especially the case
for geographically isolated institutions
which would be too costly to protect.
Examples include development projects in
remote areas and tourist hotels in national
parks.
What Is to Be Done?
How should western industrialized
countries respond to these dangers?  To a
certain extent, the problem will solve itself.
As the impression of a general insecurity in
Africa grows, which is now strengthened
even further due to the increased danger of
terrorist attacks, tourists and corporations
are increasingly turning their back on the
region.  This intensifies the existing
economic misery in the majority of these
countries.  Of course, development and
African experts react to the growing danger
of terrorism almost reflexively by warning
that the causes of terrorism must be fought.
But even if the international donor com-
munity were to devote a great deal more of
their resources to economic and social
development, fighting poverty and cultural
dialogue, it would still be decades before
African states obtained a level of develop-
ment that would make violent solutions to
conflicts unlikely.  Moreover, wealth does
not prevent the creation of terrorist cells, as
the example of Saudi Arabia shows.
The problem of a growing terrorist
threat in Africa also requires measures that
will have an effect in the short term.
Among the possibilities could be a reversal
of the trend of withdrawing militarily from
the region.  The US already appears to be
moving in this direction.  However, the fact
that neither the substantial presence of
French troops in Djibouti nor the intelli-
gence efforts of the German navy off the
coast of Somalia and East Africa were able
to prevent the attacks in Mombasa raises
doubts about the appropriateness of this
suggestion.  And an attempt to combat
terrorist cells in Somalia with an interven-
tion of Ethiopian troops had only limited
success.  Of greater importance for the
short term fight against terrorism in Africa
would be state capacity building, in particu-
lar in terms of concentrating on the reform
and support of the security sector in
general and the police in particular.
Where states, however, have disinte-
grated to such an extent that not even
enormous investment in its security forces
can ensure a state monopoly on the means
of violence, we are confronted with difficult
questions.  What are the alternatives to
direct military intervention?  Can private,
paramilitary security services, appointed by
and under the control of the international
community, exercise a localized monopoly
on violence that adheres to the principles
of human rights?
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